{"id":3253,"date":"2026-09-21T09:21:34","date_gmt":"2026-09-21T09:21:34","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/bordersandbeyond.in\/blog\/?p=3253"},"modified":"2026-09-21T09:21:35","modified_gmt":"2026-09-21T09:21:35","slug":"the-structural-technological-and-strategic-vulnerabilities-of-the-indian-air-force","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/bordersandbeyond.in\/blog\/the-structural-technological-and-strategic-vulnerabilities-of-the-indian-air-force\/","title":{"rendered":"The Structural, Technological, and Strategic Vulnerabilities of the Indian Air Force"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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Established on 8th October 1932 under British colonial rule, the Indian Air Force has grown into one of the largest and most experienced air forces. The Indian Air Force bears the burden of defending India\u2019s airspace while confronting the two-front threat posed by China and Pakistan. However, the force often faces squadron shortages, delayed modernisation and heavy dependence on foreign counterparts. These structural, technological and geopolitical constraints have highlighted the urgent need to maximise indigenous potential and work on a credible fifth-generation plan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Squadron Depletion Crisis: From 1962 Recommendations to 2026 Realities <\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The JRD Tata Committee and the Myth of 42 Squadrons –<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

India\u2019s lack of military preparedness and years of low defence prioritisation had led to a humiliating defeat in the 1962 Sino-Indian War. The JRD Tata Committee was set up in 1963 to evaluate India\u2019s air defence needs, particularly the Indian Air Force squadron shortage. The Committee had recommended a 64-squadron level, with 50 dedicated combat squadrons as the absolute baseline required to counter Chinese and Pakistani air threats. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Along with the question of the squadron shortage, the Committee strongly favoured the acquisition of Western technology as the fastest route to reach and sustain the 50 combat-squadron fleet. India had formally approached the United States to purchase the American Lockheed F-104 Starfighter, simultaneously demanding licensed production rights. The goal was to establish assembly lines at Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) to indigenously manufacture the model over the long term. However, the US declined, offering a much cheaper and lower alternative – the Northrop F-5 Freedom Fighter. A core reason why America declined is the fact that Pakistan had already acquired the F-104 Starfighter, and the US feared alienating Pakistan, which had earlier served as a US Cold War ally. Declassified American documents have also revealed that US officials viewed India as a poor nation that lacked the technical and financial capability to operate an advanced model such as the Starfighter. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 1964, former Defence Minister Y.B. Chavan led a high-level delegation to Moscow to sign the comprehensive \u201cMiG Protocol\u201d, allowing India to buy 38 fully-built MiG-21FL and 197 licensed kits allocated for domestic production and assembly by HAL.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, the MiG-21s alone could not help achieve the 50-squadron air fleet. India\u2019s post-1962 economic capacity posed a significant hurdle in achieving the desired squadron strength, due to competing demands from the Ministry of Defence to rebuild the Indian Army. Therefore, the Committee\u2019s suggestion of 50 combat squadrons was lowered to just 35 combat squadrons for the then Indian Air Force.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If insider reports are to be believed, the IAF operated at a strength of 25 combat squadrons, against the sanctioned strength of 35, in the 1965 war. The 1980s expansion and the 2012 ratification by the Government of India reaffirmed the sanctioned IAF squadron level at 42 combat aircraft.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But the question remains- is the IAF effectively utilising the sanctioned strength?<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Operational Void: Fighter Drawdown vs. Two-Front Threat Matrix –<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The Indian Air Force is suffering from one of its most intense squadron strength crises in history. Even though the sanctioned strength stands at 42 combat squadrons, the IAF is currently operating at a strength of 29-31 squadrons, that is, 500 to 550 aircraft. In addition to this wide gap, the IAF and the Ministry of Defence have realised that simply reaching 42 squadrons wouldn\u2019t prove to be sufficient in the long term.  Back in 2016, Defence Analyst Ashley Tellis evaluated IAF\u2019s requirement at around 60 squadrons. In 2025, India\u2019s Air Chief Marshal A.P. Singh highlighted the need to induct 35-40 fighter jets every year to bridge the capacity shortfall. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The People\u2019s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) of China and the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) together constitute a collusive threat to India, simultaneously forming the most essential reason as to why the IAF must strive for a more capable air fleet. The PLAAF-PAF air threat must be understood as a two-front threat where Pakistan exploits its geographical proximity to India, while China supplies strategic intelligence, technology, weapons and advanced training. Such a combined air threat puts the IAF under immense pressure, where the air force is already operating at a level much lower than the sanctioned strength of 42 combat squadrons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Shaheen joint air exercises between the PLAAF and PAF have grown in significance since its establishment in 2011. This serves as a platform to test joint aerial operations, electronic warfare and high-altitude mission capabilities that are crucial for conducting operations in such challenging terrains like the Himalayas.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Post the induction of their fifth-generation fighter jets into PLAAF operations, China is actively working and experimenting with sixth-generation jets. In May 2026, the South China Morning Post reported an initial collaborative agreement between China and the Pakistan Air Force, with possible acquisition of China\u2019s J-35A Stealth fighter. Aired footage showed an apparent export variant with markings from the Aviation Industry Corporation of China instead of the PLAAF. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Why is this news bound to trouble India?<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

China is actively operating its fifth-generation stealth fighters, even supplying Pakistan with stealth fighters like the J-35. This automatically gives Pakistan an edge over India in terms of air defence assets. The future delivery of the jets could unsettle the already fragile regional ties between the two countries. It, thus, becomes extremely necessary for India to first operate at its full sanctioned strength, and then look forward to the induction of fifth-generation jets into the IAF. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The HF-24 Marut vs. SEPECAT Jaguar: A Strategic Misstep in Indigenisation<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Kurt Tank\u2019s Vision and the Aero-Engine Mismatch –<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

India undertook the ambitious project of building a Mach 2 Supersonic Multirole Combat aircraft in 1956. For a country that had been independent for less than a decade, it was a rather brave decision to manufacture a complex design as such, domestically. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

HAL had experience building light propeller aircraft and assembling British Vampires under licence. But for the proposed project, it lacked the staff as well as the infrastructure required. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

So India sought help. And the man called to do so?<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Kurt Tank – the Head of Design at Focke-Wulf and the man who had pioneered the FW-190, the finest piston-engine fighter of the Second World War. Upon arriving in India, he expanded the design staff twelvefold and built infrastructure from scratch. By 1961, the prototype \u201cHF-24 Marut\u201d was complete, named after the storm gods of the Rigveda. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The design was genuinely impressive, with a twin-engine, swept-wing design, armed with four 30 mm cannons, 4000 lbs of bombs and designed for Mach 2. It first flew on 17th June 1961 in the hands of test pilot Wing Commander Suranjan Das. The HAL HF-24 Marut became the first fighter jet designed in Asia, outside of the Soviet Union. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Kurt Tank\u2019s design required a Bristol BOr.12 Orpheus afterburning turbojet engine, which produced 8150 lbs of thrust to support the Mach 2 vision. Bristol Siddeley named the price at \u00a313 million, which India couldn\u2019t financially commit to, considering the ongoing purchases of foreign fighter jets at a greater cost, to support its then air fleet. So, Marut flew on two non-afterburning Orpheus 703 turbojets of about 21.6 kN each, but the aircraft topped out at barely Mach 1. To push the Marut variant to its full potential, Egypt\u2019s Brandner E-300 engine programme, backed by Messerschmitt, was briefly explored. While the Marut prototype was actually flown to Egypt for trials as well, the programme collapsed in the chaos of the 1967 Arab-Israel War. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

But the HF-24 Marut did serve in the 1971 War, where two squadrons flew it hard in the low-level ground attack role over the desert in the western front. Even though the Marut never reached its Mach 2 potential, it reportedly shot down a Pakistani F-86 Sabre, and none was lost in air combat. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Only 147 HAL HF-24 Maruts were built, and Kurt Tank eventually returned to West Germany. In the 1970s and 80s, his successor, Dr. Raj Mahindra, spent years pushing for upgrades, but failed. And so when India decided to officially withdraw from the Marut production, Raj Mahindra resigned, and HAL HF-24 Marut became the Indian Air Force\u2019s biggest \u2018what-if\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The DPSA Procurement: Why New Delhi Sidelined Domestic R&D –<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

During the 1970s, India started exploring modern strike aircraft to support its \u201cDeep Penetration Strike Aircraft\u201d (DPSA) requirements. The official contenders included Dassault Mirage F1, Saab Viggen and SEPECAT Jaguar. The Swedish Saab 37 Viggen, the most advanced amongst them, was regarded as Europe\u2019s most advanced combat aircraft of its era. However, the advanced technology came alongside a roadblock- the US-origin technology used in the engine. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Viggen was powered by the Volvo RM8 turbofan, which in reality was a heavily modified and licensed derivative of the American Pratt and Whitney JT8D engine. Thus, exporting the aircraft required Washington\u2019s approval, and remained bound by US export control regulations. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Despite founding the Non-Alignment Movement, India maintained close defence relations with the Soviet Union to counter China and a US-backed Pakistan. America, therefore, became skeptical of exporting such an advanced variant to a country such as India. The prevailing geopolitical conditions and the absence of approval from the United States led to no deal regarding the Saab 37 Viggen, and India later turned towards the induction of the SEPECAT Jaguar into the IAF.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

 The Aero-Engine Crisis: GTRE Kaveri Failures and GE Supply Chain Bottlenecks<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The Anatomy of a Failed Propulsion Project: Kaveri 1.0 –<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

In 1983, India launched the \u201cLight Combat Aircraft\u201d (LCA) Programme, with the primary objective of replacing the huge yet ageing fleet of the Soviet MiG-21s. The LCA also carried the responsibility of bridging the technological gap between the HF-24 Marut and the vision of successfully developing a modern combat aircraft domestically. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the time, India was also envisioning developing a modern afterburning turbofan engine, to cut reliance on imported engines and to build an advanced indigenous propulsion system. And designing a fighter-jet engine was considered one of the most difficult technicalities in the defence sector, considering only a handful of countries like the United States, United Kingdom, Russia, France and somewhat China possessed the qualification required. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nonetheless, India formally initiated the \u201cKaveri Engine\u201d project in 1986, handing over its development responsibilities to the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE), a wing of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). The GTX-35VS \u2018Kaveri\u2019 was envisioned as a twin-spool, low-bypass afterburning turbofan engine, encompassing a dry thrust of 52 kN and an afterburning thrust of 81 kN. However, the engine could only achieve 50 kN of dry thrust and a maximum wet thrust of 70-75 kN. This technical shortfall carried direct operational consequences for the LCA, including payload capacity, slower acceleration and combat radius limitations. Additionally, the engine prototype ended up around 100 kg heavier than the estimate, and turbine entry temperatures couldn\u2019t be pushed as high as the design required due to indigenous single-crystal blades that took longer to mature than expected. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Along with these technical gaps, the lack of comprehensive test infrastructure is also known to have caused significant obstacles in the successful development of Kaveri. It is not unknown that developing an afterburning turbofan engine such as GTX-35VS Kaveri would require hours of ground testing, altitude simulations and trials, and while India\u2019s testing ecosystem was developing, most of the air trials were conducted outside of India, primarily at Russia\u2019s Gromov Flight Research Institute. In 2004, Kaveri failed the high-altitude tests conducted in Russia, and in 2008, the Kaveri Engine 1.0 project was officially delinked from the Tejas LCA Programme. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Foreign Supply Chain Trap: GE F404 Engine Delay –<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Though the Indian Government had sanctioned the Kaveri 1.0 Project, the Ministry of Defence was actively searching for alternate engines that could be imported to power the LCA prototypes. This decision was rooted in the assumption that the homegrown engine project could take even a decade to solidify into an actual usable variant, and waiting solely for it to develop would put the Indian Air Force on the backfoot. Thus, India purchased the American F404-GE-F2J3 in 1986.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But the 1998 sanctions halted India\u2019s defence aspirations.<\/em> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 1998, India broke its 24-year, self-imposed proclamation on nuclear testing by conducting five underground nuclear tests at Pokhran during 11-13 May 1998. This showcase of nuclear capabilities was India\u2019s pure attempt at signalling its national security and strategic autonomy. But the United States viewed the same from an alternative lens, thereby invoking the \u201cGlenn Agreement\u201d to impose economic sanctions on both India and Pakistan, which conducted its own nuclear tests a while later. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

As per Former US President Bill Clinton, India had violated the global non-proliferation norms, therefore attracting strict sanctions from America. As part of the Glenn Agreement, the US ordered the termination of the US Government\u2019s sale of defence articles and services to India. Consequently, the sale of GE-404 engines as well as the fly-by-wire flight system was also suspended. American engineers working on the Indian LCA were withdrawn, leaving the IAF stranded with just 11 GE engines that the country had initially procured. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In September 2001, the sanctions were fully lifted, paving the way for India to advance its defence relationship with the United States. India placed an order for 17 advanced GE-F404-IN20 variants in 2004, followed by 24 more such models ordered in 2007. Across two separate contracts signed by HAL, India purchased a total of 212 engines, split into 99 from the 2021 contract and another 113 in 2025, to power India\u2019s Tejas Mk1A fighter jets.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, problems started arising from the record delays on the part of GE Aerospace. Out of the 2021 contract, only 10 engines have been delivered. Why?<\/em> GE faced widespread supply chain disruptions, especially due to its dependence on 15 external suppliers for critical components, further creating production bottlenecks. Reportedly, delays were also recorded due to the alleged bankruptcy of a South Korean subcontractor that manufactured essential parts for the engine. The recent US-Israel-Iran War had also severely impacted transit lines and pushed forward the delivery timelines.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As of mid-2026, HAL has structurally completed and flight-tested around 30 Tejas Mk1A airframes. However, none of the Tejas Mk1A has been formally incorporated into the Indian Air Force, owing to the backlog in the delivery of GE-F404-IN20, a critical component of the Tejas variant. The recent delivery in August 2026 has provided no aid to the given question and proves to be insufficient to start squadron-level deliveries. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Path to Propulsion Sovereignty: Dry Kaveri and the Safran 110kN Joint Venture<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The pivot towards \u201cDry Kaveri\u201d in 2008 was marked by the technical failure of Kaveri 1.0 and its official delinking from the Tejas LCA in the same year. Owing to engineering flaws, the GTRE couldn\u2019t conceptualise the Kaveri engine into an actual usable variant. However, further research revealed that the dry configuration, producing a thrust of around 46-52 kN, could in fact power India\u2019s highly classified stealth drone programme, the DRDO \u201cGhatak Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle\u201d (UCAV). Drones do not require afterburning thrust, which was the main conflict with the Kaveri 1.0 project. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Dry Kaveri engine has completed over 140 hours of rigorous flight testing, successfully delivering a stable dry thrust of 49-51 kN. The engine is no longer a prototype and is on track to receive its formal military certification in late 2026. The indigenous engine programme is designated to be the primary power for the DRDO Ghatak UCAV.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The MiG-21 Legacy: Maintenance Realities, Public Perception, and the 2025\u20132026 Phase-Out<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The Soviet MiG-21, one of India\u2019s most iconic fighter jets, was first inducted into the IAF fleet long back in 1963. For the first time, the MiG-21 was used during the 1965 War by Squadron No.28 \u2018The First Supersonics\u2019 and provided the IAF with crucial insight into how to maximise the aircraft\u2019s potential for greater combat effectiveness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Deconstructing the “Flying Coffin” Narrative: Training Deficits vs. Airframe Fatigue<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

\u201cFlying Coffin\u201d, \u201cWidowmaker\u201d \u2013 These are the names that the MiG-21 earned during its time in the Indian Air Force. Despite record achievements, the MiG-21\u2019s tainted reputation arises from its high accident rates dating back to the late 20th<\/sup> and early 21st<\/sup> century.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Rahul Bedi, a known Defence Analyst, has consistently argued that the aircraft\u2019s accident record was less about technical complications and more about systemic issues in pilot training and aircraft acquisition. India had inducted a total of 874 MiG-21 aircraft, 657 of which were indigenously produced by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 2012, Former Defence Minister A.K. Antony publicly announced in Parliament that more than half of the aircraft purchased had crashed, resulting in the deaths of 171 pilots, 39 civilians and 8 other servicemen. The MiG had demanding flight characteristics, including its comparatively smaller size, limited cockpit visibility and the high landing speed of over 300 km\/h. The aircraft was never meant to be operated by rookie pilots, owing to its unforgiving operational tactics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

So what were the systemic errors?<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Young rookie pilots fresh out of basic propeller training were forced to transition directly to the MiG-21. Pilots who lacked immediate jet training were regularly overwhelmed by the MiG\u2019s fast landing speeds, often leading to spatial disorientation and runway crashes. Defence experts have repeatedly pointed out the increasingly high flying hours of the aircraft \u2013 more flying hours, more crashes. Some experts have critically targeted the Government as well as the Indian Air Force for outdated excuses of bureaucratic delays when asked to retire the MiG-21 earlier.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 2005, the Lahiri Committee found that technical failures constituted only 39% of the total accidents while 43% were a result of human error. The most critical finding was the absence of \u2018Advanced Jet Trainers\u2019, which are of utmost significance for young pilots. The absence of adequate jet handling experience often led to high-rate terminal crashes near runways. Another major reason uncovered by the committee was a severe lag in the quality of the Tumansky R-25 engines incorporated in the MiGs. These were overhauled and assembled at HAL, but reports have classified that micro-fractures in the engine blades caused instant mid-air explosions, unfortunately on the part of HAL.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Operational Impact of Bidding Farewell to the Bison <\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

On 26th<\/sup> September 2025, the Indian Air Force officially retired the Soviet-origin MiG-21 Bison fighter jets, with Squadron No. 23 \u2018Panthers\u2019 becoming the last air force squadron to operate the iconic fighter. The decommissioning ceremony was held at Chandigarh Air Force Station, where the aircraft was first inducted in 1963.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the 1990s, India\u2019s Tejas LCA started facing technical and bureaucratic delays, with the Kaveri 1.0 constituting a major reason behind this shortfall. At the time, the MiG-21 formed the absolute backbone of the IAF but had started approaching the end of its service life. So in 1996, HAL established a contract with Russia\u2019s Phazotron to upgrade 125 existing MiG-21bis into the Bison variant. This decision was a direct attempt to cost-effectively modernise the existing MiG airframes and to prevent further depletion in the IAF squadrons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The MiG-21 Bison upgrade consisted of the Phazotron Kopyo pulse-Doppler radar interceptor that provided shoot-down and track-while-scan capability, enabling detection and engagement of low-lying targets. Simultaneously, the integration of the R-77 active-radar BVR missile allowed the Bison to employ beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles. The MiG pilots could now exploit helmet-mounted sights and high-off-boresight short-range missiles during close-range encounters. Finally, the Bison package added countermeasure dispensers and electronic warfare features to improve sustainability and enhance training value.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The retirement of the MiG-21 Bison in 2025 was accompanied by the vision of inducting the Tejas Mk1A into the Indian Air Force squadrons.  The first Tejas Mk1A manufactured at HAL\u2019s Nashik division completed its maiden flight on 17th<\/sup> October 2025. While the official induction of the combat fighter into the IAF fleet remains pending, the test demonstrated India\u2019s active efforts to expand its fighter manufacturing capacity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Tejas Mk1A aims to serve as a lightweight multi-role combat fighter, capable of interception, close air support and tactical strike missions. The comparatively smaller radar cross-section, digital flight control system and integrated AESA radar suite are intended to enhance its operational qualifications. Alongside these improvements, the Mk1A variant would include an onboard oxygen generation system for increased mission endurance as well as the ability to employ dual-rack pylons to enable wider weapons load-out.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Geopolitical Realities: US Unreliability and 5th-Gen Imperatives<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The United States has periodically demonstrated its unreliability, which is why India must not solely depend on India-US defence ties. What started with the Pokhran sanctions on India back in 1998 has now manifested itself in the form of the \u201cInternational Traffic in Arms Regulations\u201d (ITAR) and \u201cCountering America\u2019s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act\u201d (CAATSA). The United States\u2019 unreliability remains limited not just to the economic sanctions and regulations, but can also be observed in the mounting delays by GE Aerospace in its delivery of the required engine variants. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The US as a Volatile Defence Partner: ITAR, CAATSA, and Technology Transfer Limits <\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The \u201cInternational Traffic in Arms Regulations\u201d (ITAR) functions as a regulatory regime that treats the majority of the advanced weapons, platforms and the associated technical data as defence articles and services to be strictly controlled under the US Munitions List. In the past, India has been denied access to source codes and mission computer software of American-built platforms, owing to the ITAR. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

This US regulation thus supports a direct buyer-seller model rather than fostering deep industrial partnership. This has limited India\u2019s ability to independently modify its equipment. For instance, if India wants to integrate the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile onto an American platform, it legally and technically must wait for US approval. This has denied India any extent of operational flexibility, even in unexpected defence scenarios. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

India is reportedly to have rejected the American sale of F-35, due to the same reason – the tight restriction maintained by the US over access to its core source code, software architecture and maintenance data files. Former Air Marshal Anil Chopra has clearly stated that India remains \u201ccautious about the US tendency to exert pressure and abandon allies when their own interests diverge\u201d. According to him, a reliable partner is a must, for the country must not impose undue pressure on the other party, indirectly hinting at why the F-35 deal remained unfinished business. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Apart from ITAR, the \u201cCountering America\u2019s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act\u201d (CAATSA) has also proved US unreliability in the defence sector. Enacted in August 2017 by President Donald Trump, CAATSA aims to counter the aggression posed by Iran, Russia and North Korea. Primarily, it targets Russian interests in the oil and gas industry, defence and security, as well as the finance sector. Why?<\/em> Because Russia intervened militarily in Ukraine and allegedly meddled in the 2016 US Presidential elections – and since then has remained poles apart from US interests. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Section 231 of the act allows the US President to impose significant sanctions on the entity that engages with the defence or intelligence sectors of Russia. Significant sanctions include US export licences, denial of Export-Import Bank support, limits on US bank loans, and so on. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

How does this involve India?<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

For India, CAATSA created potential sanctions risk over India\u2019s commitment to purchase Russian S-400 in 2018. Throughout 2018 and the years leading up to the initial deliveries in 2021, US officials under Trump and Biden\u2019s administrations have given heated warnings to India. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Defence secretaries and State Department representatives publicly declared that the multi-billion dollar contract qualified as a \u2018significant transaction\u2019 with Russia’s blacklisted defence sector and could legally trigger secondary sanctions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, in a turn of events, the CAATSA Waiver was passed by the US House of Representatives in July 2022, in an attempt to remove the regulation that irritated India-US relations, especially concerning the defence sector. As per official reports, the purpose of CAATSA was never to punish America\u2019s allies. Several officials, including Ro Khanna, an Indian-American Democratic Congressman from California, had acknowledged that India needed to maintain defence ties with Russia in facing any serious and immediate threats from China. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

AMCA and the Stealth Imperative: Rolls-Royce, Safran, and Private Sector Integration <\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

AMCA stands for India\u2019s indigenous \u201cAdvanced Medium Combat Aircraft\u201d, a fifth-generation fighter jet defence aspiration. AMCA is being led by the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), which functions under the DRDO. The AMCA is being envisioned as a twin-engine, all-weather, stealth medium-weight combat aircraft, designed for air superiority.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft\u2019s conceptualisation can be traced back to the mid-2000s, with the design work coming to age in the 2010s. In 2024, the Cabinet Committee on Security sanctioned the project with an initial budget of roughly Rs. 15,000 crore. The programme is structured to incorporate two variants, that is, AMCA Mark 1 paired with the GE-F414 engine, and the AMCA Mark 2 to be paired with a 110-kilonewton-class engine to be co-developed through transfer of technology, with France\u2019s Safran and Britain\u2019s Rolls-Royce among the discussed entities.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In May 2025, the Ministry of Defence approved the \u201cProgramme Execution Model\u201d for the AMCA. For the first time, India\u2019s prestigious aerospace programme was open to competitive participation, keeping the private sector bidders at par. Recently, the ADA issued a Request for Proposal to three shortlisted bidders for the development of the fifth-generation combat fighter prototypes. The all-private sector bidders included Tata Advanced Systems, L&T and Bharat Forge.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This race to power the AMCA Mark 2 has evolved into a strategic contest between two proposals, that is, the Safran deal and the partnership between Reliance and Rolls-Royce. Both the deals are offering 100% transfer of technology, full ownership of intellectual property and complete access to source codes. However, France’s Safran deal is a public sector initiative involving DRDO\u2019s Gas Turbine Research Establishment, where a core engine design of 110-120 kN is being targeted. Conversely, the Rolls-Royce-Reliance partnership is a private sector-led venture proposing a 120-145 kN engine architecture, alongside the construction of an end-to-end \u201cAerospace Gas Turbine Complex\u201d to utilise the massive capital scale of India’s largest private conglomerate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As of September 2026, the Rs. 61,000 crore Safran-DRDO deal stands at the finish line, having completed all necessary technical evaluations, waiting for the final approval from the Cabinet Committee on Security. However, the Reliance-Rolls-Royce venture is a more recent counter-offer, meant to provide tough competition when the CCS comes out with a verdict. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

CONCLUSION <\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The Indian Air Force presently stands at a critical point – squadron shortages, record delays in indigenous commitments and dependence on foreign technology have left the IAF operating at a strength much lower than the sanctioned strength of 42 squadrons.  The ambitious projects of HF-24 Marut and Kaveri 1.0 showcased India’s commitment to indigenous development but lost to technical shortcomings. The MiG-21 was retired even before the induction of its successor, Tejas Mk1A or the AMCA, further intensifying the squadron shortage crisis. Foreign regulations of ITAR and CAATSA have highlighted that the United States would continue to prioritise its own strategic interests, and might not prove to be the most reliable defence partner to India. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Presently, India must focus on converting its current engine partnerships – the Safran deal and the Rolls-Royce-Reliance venture into a strategic reality. This aligns with India\u2019s vision of indigenously manufacturing a fifth-generation combat fighter jet. Without bridging the technological gap between ambition and operational capability, the Indian Air Force will continue to experience such vulnerabilities. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQs)<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Q1:<\/strong> What Squadron Strength Did the JRD Tata Committee Recommend, and What Is The Indian Air Force\u2019s Current Operating Level?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A:<\/strong> The 1963 JRD Tata Committee recommended a 64-squadron strength, with 50 combat squadrons as the baseline. However, the Ministry of Defence formalised the strength at 35 combat squadrons, citing financial restraints. Later, the sanctioned level was raised to 42 squadrons but the IAF has been operating at just 29-31 squadrons, a strength that falls short of the formal sanction. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Q2:<\/strong> What Were the Main Technical Reasons Behind Kaveri 1.0\u2019s Failure?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A:<\/strong> The GTRE-GTX-35VS \u2018Kaveri\u2019 was envisioned as a twin-spool, low-bypass afterburning turbofan engine, capable of a dry thrust of 52 kN and an afterburning thrust of 81 kN. However, due to technical gaps, the prototype could only achieve 50 kN of dry thrust and a maximum of 70-75 kN of wet thrust. Additionally, the Kaveri prototype was approximately 100 kg heavier than the calculated estimate. These factors directly affected its operational capabilities, including payload capacity, slower acceleration and combat radius limitations.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Q3:<\/strong> What Were the Direct Consequences of the 1998 Sanctions on India?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A:<\/strong> In 1998, Former US President Bill Clinton invoked the Glenn Agreement, thereby imposing economic sanctions on India. He ordered the termination of the US Government\u2019s sale of defence articles and services to India. This resulted in the suspension of the sale of American GE-F404 engines and the fly-by-wire flight system to India. The American engineers involved in the Indian Light Combat Aircraft programme were also withdrawn and called back.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Q4:<\/strong> What Did the Lahiri Committee Identify as the Main Causes of MiG-21 Accidents?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A:<\/strong> The 2005 Lahiri Committee pointed out that technical failures constituted 39% of the total accidents, while 43% resulted from human error. Key factors included the absence of advanced jet training for young rookie pilots, as well as the micro-fractures recorded in the HAL-overhauled Tumansky R-25 engine blades. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Q5:<\/strong> How Is India Fulfilling Its Fifth-Generation Fighter Jet Dreams?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A:<\/strong> India is advancing its fifth-generation fighter jet aspirations through the ADA-led \u201cAdvanced Medium Combat Aircraft\u201d (AMCA) programme. The indigenous aircraft is being designed as a twin-engine, all-weather, stealth medium-weight combat aircraft meant for air superiority. Involving three private bidders for the development of the AMCA prototype, the programme is centred around two variants – AMCA Mark 1 and AMCA Mark 2.<\/p>\n

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